Alckmin and the trap of the vice-presidents

There is an unavoidable question surrounding the nomination of Geraldo Alckmin as the vice-presidential candidate on the ticket headed by Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva.

Recruited to serve as loyal allies, destined to guarantee the stability of an elected government and support the incumbent, our vice presidents wrote a much more complicated political history -- and one doesn't need to recall Michel Temer's criminal role to understand this.

In a country where the ruling class understandably fears popular sovereignty, due to a well-known difficulty in exercising state power through the established channels of democracy, the vice-presidential position has served as an emergency solution when the incumbent fails to meet the needs of the elite.

Formally appointed to occupy the reserve bench for the number 1 position in the Republic, a function that can be justified in various circumstances, vice-presidents often assume the role of watchdogs of the old order, ensuring, if necessary, that any eventual replacement of the incumbent, even in an unfair and truculent manner, can be processed without setbacks or challenges -- or even with advantages compared to their predecessor.

An exemplary case was that of Café Filho, imposed by Adhemar de Barros on Getúlio Vargas's ticket in 1950. During the government's first serious crisis – triggered by the Tonelero Street attack – Café Filho had already switched sides and wanted to convince Getúlio to resign the presidency, promising to do the same and call for new elections. The president did not accept, but the vice-president did not give up.

Called upon to replace Getúlio after his suicide, Café Filho already had a new government ready to be sworn in, composed of first-rate conspirators to occupy the ministry and overthrow the inherited legacy.
At the end of a presidency that seemed destined to fall from the sky, when a victory for Juscelino at the polls heralded the continuation of Getúlio Vargas's political legacy, Café Filho joined a conspiracy aimed at preventing JK from taking office.

His role was to feign illness, allowing him to take leave from his post and hand over the position to Carlos Luz, the Speaker of the House, a blatant coup plotter. Those familiar with the story know that, in the final chapter, it took the intervention of Marshal Henrique Lott to prevent the embarrassment. Only then was the candidate who won the election sworn in.

JK himself experienced a situation with similarities and differences. Like Getúlio, he was the target of constant conspiracies to remove him from office, even before he took office.

Unlike Getúlio, JK had a vice-president, João Goulart, who was a pure-blooded member of the labor movement. From the point of view of his opponents, removing JK to give power to Jango was like swapping one bad situation for another—or perhaps even a bad one.

Although he was the target of constant coup attempts, it was obvious that, from the point of view of a right-wing project, it would be unthinkable to discard JK in order to install Jango.

Vice-presidents serve this purpose: they offer a functional way out for a movement that originated as a coup but can be called institutional. Everything seems to have happened within the law—including a shameful operation like the coup that ousted Dilma. Therein lies the trap.

Any questions?