Aécio is the new Marina.

The exaggeration surrounding Aécio Neves' "surprising" vote count amplifies the modest triumph of surpassing Marina Silva, a weak candidate without party structure. It also contributes to overshadowing the former governor's embarrassing defeat in Minas Gerais.

Repeating the "Marina hurricane" scenario, the mainstream press is now constructing an Aécio of sporting mythology, a tireless and skillful fighter who dodges obstacles on his way to the podium. Speeches of overcoming adversity and turnaround replace the hopeful novelty that recently dominated references to the PSB candidate.

With Aécio, analysts are once again overestimating the strength of their preferred candidate. It's the same self-deception that made Marina the savior of the opposition, giving her an illusory favoritism that ultimately only harmed her.

The 33% support for the Minas Gerais candidate was unexpected only from the perspective of the polls. It represents the historical contribution of the opposition during the PT years, which oscillated towards Marina and returned to Aécio in the wake of state-level decisions, particularly in São Paulo. The current scenario resembles that of 2006, when Lula defeated José Serra with relative ease.

There is an excessive amount of respect for Aécio's lead in São Paulo. Dilma's advantage in the Northeast was twice as large. The federal base elected governors in 10 states, accumulating 15 million votes that could migrate from the winners to Dilma. The PSDB received the same number of votes in São Paulo and Paraná, but only won there.

The Workers' Party's strategy was correct in favoring a second round against Aécio. He is not as competitive as Marina would be. The shadow of the FHC years, the scandalous repertoire of the PSDB, and the embarrassing episodes of the candidate himself provide a volume of negative material that would never have an equivalent in the former senator. The videos in which Aécio appears, let's say, confused, illustrate the magnitude of the problem.

The PT vs. PSDB polarization favors Dilma. First, thanks to the comparison between the federal governments of both parties. Second, because, with the tug-of-war over corruption neutralized, the PSDB is associated with unpopular platforms (privatizations, unemployment, austerity) that voters almost inertially reject.

Marina's formal support seems irrelevant. Not even the few hundred sincere supporters of Rede will automatically migrate to Aécio. A large part of the PSB's militants sympathize with Lula's policies or repudiate the PSDB's legacy. This group is much larger than the third of the votes Marina received, a sufficient share to elect Dilma.

This is not about downplaying the PT's difficulties, but about preventing its militants from adopting the alarmism of the pro-PSDB media. We knew from the beginning that the final contest would be fierce, and against these adversaries. The hysterical unpredictability is a propaganda creation to mold the campaign to Aécio Neves' profile.

The seductive narrative of novelty crumbled with Marina and will crumble with Aécio as well. The Workers' Party leadership simply needs to follow the combative script of past elections. There's no reason for pessimism. Not, at least, among Dilma Rousseff's supporters.