The plague of political opportunism within the bowels of a discredited Brazilian state.

Physiologism refers to a promiscuous type of political power relations in which political actions and decisions are made in exchange for favors and other benefits to private interests. It is a phenomenon that occurs relatively frequently in parliaments of countries that foster corrupt power systems, as well as in the Executive branch, even reaching the Judiciary the more systematized the physiologism becomes. Political parties can be considered physiologists when they grant their support regardless of the coherence between ideologies or party programs. Physiologism can be defined as the conduct or practice of certain representatives and public servants that aims at satisfying personal or partisan interests or advantages to the detriment of the common good, very close to political clientelism.

We could stop at this definition of physiologism, but for the sake of clarity and to avoid vagueness, we offer other definitions of the permanent "tempests" that characterize Brazilian politics. Thus:

Political clientelism is a subsystem of political relations, where one person receives protection from another in exchange for political support. What characterizes clientelism is the system of exchange where the "client" is in total submission to the "patron," regardless of whether they have any relationship other than promiscuity.

Coronelismo is the set of political actions of large landowners – strictly speaking – (called colonels) at the local, regional, or federal level, where economic and social dominance is applied to manipulate elections for their own benefit or that of private individuals. It is a social and political phenomenon typical of the Old Republic, characterized by the prestige of a political boss and his power to command. While in the process of extinction in Brazil, it persists in several forgotten municipalities across the country.

Nepotism is the term used to describe the favoritism shown to relatives to the detriment of meritocracy, especially with regard to appointments or promotions, particularly to appointed positions.

Corporatism is an action in which the defense of the interests or privileges of an organized sector of society prevails, to the detriment of the public interest. For example, when a public agent commits some deviation from their official duties and ends up being protected by the category to which they belong, not receiving the sanction that would be applied to them by legal provision – in a broad sense.

Coalition presidentialism refers to the reality of a presidential system where the fragmentation of parliamentary power among various parties forces the Executive branch into a practice more commonly associated with parliamentarism. To govern, it needs to forge a broad majority that is often contradictory to the ideological programs of the ruling party. Coalition presidentialism is the driving force behind patronage among the branches of power, since to govern the Executive needs Parliament, and immersed in a corrupt system of negotiations (better described as shady deals), it exchanges mutual favors far removed from the public interest and suitable for various crimes that use public money as a means to support it. Today, Brazil inevitably lives under a system of co-optation. Principles such as legality, impartiality, morality, efficiency, and transparency are often relegated to a secondary or tertiary level. It is worth remembering what our 1988 Constitution states:

Art. 37. The direct and indirect public administration of any of the Powers of the Union, the States, the Federal District and the Municipalities shall comply with the principles of legality, impartiality, morality, publicity and efficiency, and also with the following:

(...).

As we can see in Brazil, we glimpse a country with many qualifications that disqualify us. With each year of observation that I gather throughout my life, I conclude with greater certainty that our problem is in fact much more human than political. We bring together exclusive interests and practice "every man for himself," and when there's plenty of flour, my man for himself first, second, and third.

When we realize that we coexist in a state shrouded in inverted values, and that even those who should represent us as the greatest bastions of constitutional principles completely deviate from their missions, hope is inhibited and despair oppresses us.

For quite some time now, political opportunism has not been exclusive to essentially political institutions of power; it finds no outlet or communication only in our legislative and executive branches, but reverberates with increasing fluidity in our judiciary. Opportunism has become increasingly uninhibited when dealing with jurisdictions pertaining to interests dear to politics. We find, almost predictably, the true ratio decidendi behind the veil in certain jurisdictions where opportunism predominates as a veiled orientation stemming from spurious cronyism—decisions in which the best law, based on a sense of justice and equity, is utterly vilified.

The Brazilian Supreme Court (STF), especially when it decides unilaterally by some of its justices, or even in panels based on pre-arranged understandings, has blatantly decided without reasonable legal basis, following the path of political opportunism. A concrete case, when it reaches the STF, rarely yields a single possible solution through mere subsumption, especially when dealing with more complex cases encompassing diverse interpretations, often guided by principles, as part of a growing neo-constitutionalism.

The most complex cases generally involve more than one possible final decision, such as:

The decision that best embodies justice and equity, that adheres to the guiding principles of the Constitution, and that generally fulfills the desires of the public interest—that is the ideal.

That which clings to a literal interpretation of the law that can conveniently be applied to that specific case, but which, if applied, will not prove to be the fairest decision, as there is another possible and constitutional way to achieve justice;

That which reveals itself to be almost monstrous, in clear defiance of the best legal principles, the result of argumentative juggling aimed at achieving a specific end.

Because the Supreme Federal Court (STF), we reiterate, especially through its monocratic decisions and sometimes through its esteemed panels, has regrettably opted not infrequently for hypotheses B and C as ways of practicing political opportunism. It is also not uncommon to find plenary decisions by biased majorities, with roots rooted in opportunism and a blatant bias towards political opportunism, rather than feigning the pursuit of the fairest decision that reflects the best law.

It is clear that the Judiciary, especially the courts as sources of collegiate jurisdiction, is undergoing a process of discrediting. Society has already perceived with perplexing clarity how much our superior courts are operating with hidden political patronage. A country that loses faith in its justice system is a country absolutely doomed to failure. There is an urgent need to cleanse what is rotten so that new perspectives can emerge and we can rediscover a process of accreditation. A discredited Judiciary leads to a society in despair.