2016: The year of the coup and its failure.

It was a successful year for the Brazilian right. Their long-standing project to remove the PT governments finally succeeded. Thus ended the most important political period in Brazilian history, with the most extensive social inclusion project in a country marked by profound inequalities throughout its history.

Other similar attempts had failed, from the threat to impeach Lula in 2005, which they backed down from for fear of popular reaction; through the elections, lost by the opposition, in 2006, 2010 and 2014, to the project of destabilizing Dilma's second government, which culminated in the coup that removed her from office.

This was, without a doubt, the biggest political phenomenon of the year, due to the profound consequences it brought, both in the disruption of the democratic process and in the brutal measures taken by the government to dismantle the Brazilian state, undo the social rights gained in recent years, attack workers' rights, and end the sovereign foreign policy that Brazil had adopted.

But, at the same time, the speed of the dismantling process itself, implemented by the coup government, allowed that same year to witness the failure of the coup. In what sense can one speak of failure, if it is succeeding in achieving its main objectives, of which the constitutional amendment establishing a spending cap for social policies is a fundamental axis?

The original plan for the coup was to isolate, demoralize, and defeat Dilma's government, and to impose a strategic defeat on the left and the popular movement as a whole, from which the left would need a long time to recover. The accusations of corruption, coupled with those of alleged incompetence, were intended to remove the left from the center of the political scene for a long time.

Temer announced his intention to reunify the country, to restore confidence in the economy, to establish a government of dialogue with all forces, and to recover economic growth. His government managed to advance, in a short time, devastating measures for public assets, with Petrobras being its prime victim so far. Taking advantage of the company's weakening due to corruption accusations, they seek to sell public assets, as if this were the solution to recover it and as if the crisis affecting it were much deeper than it actually is.

It has managed to drastically cut, for a long time, resources for social programs, while preserving those destined for paying the interest on the debt. It is moving to cut workers' retirement rights, as well as to accentuate outsourcing processes.

On the international stage, the coup has been devastating for the sovereign image of foreign policy that Brazil has maintained since 2003.

With these achievements, couldn't one say that the coup was successful? That its fundamental objectives are being achieved?

It turns out that, first and foremost, the left, both its parties and its social movements, were certainly shaken by the end of the governments that emerged in 2003, but they assimilated these blows and resumed large-scale mobilization processes, reclaiming the streets for the left, while the government isolates itself and feels constantly harassed by these mobilizations.

The success of a project so profoundly restorative and expropriative of the rights of the masses has to increasingly resort to repression, as its agenda is exclusively negative and anti-popular. This factor further isolates the government, exposes it to extremely low popularity ratings, prevents its president from even minimally circulating throughout the country, in addition to the embarrassing situations it has faced internationally.

Despite repeated accusations of corruption against members of the PT (Workers' Party) and Lula himself, he has not been affected by any evidence, while the accusations have begun to directly target the very core of the government and Michel Temer himself. The stability of the government and its very capacity for continuity are affected by the combination of these accusations and their effects on government ministers, by the deepening recession with no prospect of economic recovery, by the further decline in support for the government, and by initiatives aimed at replacing it within the coup itself.

None of the initial objectives of the coup succeeded: neither the prolonged demoralization of the left, nor the fall in Lula's popularity, nor the reunification of the country around the new government, nor the regaining of confidence in the economy, nor a climate of pacification in the country. The government is moving forward with its harsh adjustments, but paying a high price for the unpopular nature of the measures it takes daily. It cannot appear, not even to big business and the old media, as a government that is victoriously confronting the country's major problems. Its disrepute only increases; nobody in the country trusts Temer. His survival in office is due more to inertia and the difficulties of building an alternative without deeply harming the bloc that united in the fight against the PT and its governments, but which proves incapable of carrying out its original political project in a cohesive way.

Thus, 2017 is projected to be the fourth consecutive year of profound political instability, accompanied by the greatest social crisis the country has seen in a long time. It is difficult to imagine how long the Temer government might last, or what alternative could replace him within the coup, but it is certain that social mobilizations will further isolate the government, the demand for direct elections will grow, the country will experience situations of tension and uncertainty, while the objective of the political persecution of Lula will have some form of outcome that will profoundly affect the future of Brazil.