171, a number that corners Temer
Because she lacked the support of 171 deputies, Dilma Rousseff's impeachment request was approved by an "assembly of bandits" on the night of April 19th. This is approximately the number of deputies united in the Centrão (center-right bloc), which, aside from the timidity, helps explain Michel Temer's rapid retreat from the decision to appoint the PSDB (Brazilian Social Democracy Party) member Antônio Imbassahy to the Secretariat of Government, a position previously held by Geddel Vieira Lima and responsible for the government's political coordination. Sooner or later, Temer may need 171 deputies to block one of the impeachment requests against him already presented to the Chamber of Deputies; read Tereza Cruvinel's analysis of Imbassahy's fall, even before he assumed office.
Because she lacked the support of 171 deputies, Dilma Rousseff's impeachment request was approved by an "assembly of bandits" on the night of April 19th. This is approximately the number of deputies united in the Centrão (center-right bloc), which, aside from the timidity, helps explain Michel Temer's rapid retreat from the decision to appoint the PSDB (Brazilian Social Democracy Party) member Antônio Imbassahy to the Secretariat of Government, a position previously held by Geddel Vieira Lima and responsible for the government's political coordination. Sooner or later, Temer may need 171 deputies to block one of the impeachment requests against him already presented to the Chamber of Deputies.
If the PSDB (Brazilian Social Democracy Party) candidate fails to secure a place in the core of the government, Temer will have to compensate the party with something more valuable. What they want, as everyone knows, is control of the economy, although there is neither the time nor the conditions for the creation of a new FHC (Fernando Henrique Cardoso): someone who can become electorally viable through successful economic management. Time is short and the situation is very different from that of 1983/84, when the problem was simply inflation. Now the country is experiencing a depression that is being deepened day by day by political uncertainty, and which will have no remedy other than the re-legitimization of the system through the calling of direct elections. Preferably general elections, since the credibility of Congress has also hit rock bottom.
It is pressure from the PSDB party that Temer is venturing on a trip through the Northeast today, on an agenda that sought to keep the people away to avoid boos and chants of "Out with Temer." And with this, he is pushing the decision on the replacement of Geddel, who operated in sync with the Centrão (center-right bloc), until next week.
Now, with December flying by amidst the daily crises, it will be difficult to prevent the rupture of the "super parliamentary base" that Temer boasts so much about. Governments that fail to properly manage the succession in the presidency of the Chamber of Deputies usually pay a high price. It happened with Lula, when the split in his base led to the victory of Severino Cavalcanti in 2005. It happened with Dilma in 2015, when the PT challenged Eduardo Cunha and lost, initiating the split with the PMDB. Within Temer's base, there are two candidates from the Centrão (Jovair Arantes (PTB) and Rogério Rosso (PSD)) and the candidacy of Rodrigo Maia, in addition to that of Imbassahy himself, from the PSDB. With him as minister and out of the running, those in the Centrão suspect that the PSDB would start working for Rodrigo Maia. That's why the veto. They know that Temer cannot withstand pressure.
Sooner or later, one of his impeachment requests will have to be considered. Maia will reject them all, but the opposition may appeal to the plenary, creating for the government the need for a blockade of the proposal by 171 votes. The number of the Centrão (center-right bloc). But the coup within the coup could also come through another route, that of the TSE (Superior Electoral Court). Just like in the STF (Supreme Federal Court), that court also has the talent and competence to adjust legal interpretations to political interests.
* This is an opinion article, the responsibility of the author, and does not reflect the opinion of Brasil 247.
